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expectations data. It is natural, for instance, to assume that the econometrician cannot 
observe idiosyncratic shocks to both permanent and transitory components of income. In this 
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on panel data elicited yearly from British households. We find evidence of superior 
information consistent with standard income modelling. 
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1 Introduction
Survey data are often incomplete, failing to record some information relevant to the
behaviour of the agent. The econometrician thus faces an informational disadvantage
relative to the agents he observes. It is commonplace to assume that rational agents
make forecasts based on a theoretical model which describes the true data generating
process, using all relevant information. Agents condition on the full information set
when taking expectations, but the disadvantaged econometrician can but condition on
a limited information set. However, the survey might include subjective expectation
reports of the agents. We examine whether aspects of agents’ superior information
relative to the econometrician’s limited information are captured in subjective expec-
tations data.
This issue is investigated in the context of income processes, where variants of er-
ror component models have become the standard modelling device. Below we refer to
this class as the Canonical Models (CM) of income. For instance, it is natural to as-
sume that the econometrician cannot observe idiosyncratic shocks to both permanent
and transitory components of income. The Canonical Models focus on the variances
and covariances of income changes, and thus on risk. The issue is to disentangle infor-
mation from risk. As a motivating example consider the literature on precautionary
savings. Here, the variance of income changes conditional on the full information
set determines consumption and savings by the agent. If the econometrician does
not observe all relevant information, his perception of uncertainty, as measured by
the limited information variance, will exceed that of the agent. The same reasoning
applies to the recent literature on the measurement of risk, where measures are often
computed on cross-sectional data. In another setting, the econometrician could have
an informational advantage, leading to a downward bias of the risk measure, if in-
formation collection about e.g. sector-specific unemployment shocks is too costly for
the agent. We make these examples more precise below.
Our empirical implementation is based on the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) which in each wave elicits subjective expectation reports from respondents.
The expectation data are categorical, which is a common form found in many surveys
(e.g. indices of consumer expectation, sentiments, or confidence). In particular, our
expectations data about income changes is in the same format as the Dutch data
analysed by Das and van Soest (1997, 1999, 2001), and Das, Dominitz and van
Soest (1999). These authors, however, focus on the modelling of the expectations
data and on tests of the rational expectations hypothesis. We follow Das, Dominitz
and van Soest (1999) and Manski (1990), and assume the categorical reports satisfy
a ‘best-case’ mean-report hypothesis. Not all expectation data in the literature are
categorical. Dominitz (1998, 2001) and Dominitz and Manski (1997) use probabilistic
expectations collected in Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE), while Guiso et al.
(1992, 1996, 2002) and Pistaferri (2001) use the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW). Dominitz (2001) considers the problem of estimating
subjective expectations conditional on observed attributes. Guiso et al. (1992, 1996)
use the expectation data to study portfolio allocation and subjective uncertainty, and
test for precautionary savings. Guiso et al. (2002) estimate empirical profiles of
2
income uncertainty over the working career taking into account that the distribution
of future income depends on institutional features of the labour market. Pistaferri
(2001) tests the permanent income hypothesis with quadratic preferences, i.e. the
model which rules out precautionary savings. The coarseness of our categorical data
might be considered a disadvantage compared to the probabilistic data, and this
data limitation should be borne in mind. On the other hand, questions seeking to
elicit probabilistic data are more diﬃcult to understand by respondents especially in
telephone interviews, and the panel nature of both SHIW and SEE is limited. For
instance only 126 of 622 respondents in the SEE have responded in the spring 1994
follow up to the spring 1993 interview (Dominitz, 1998), thus limiting the comparison
between expectations and actual realisations. We have at our disposal a large and
long panel with a rich set of covariates. We find evidence of superior information of
agents consistent with the Canonical Model of income.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 exposits the Canonical Model of
income, defines the information sets, and proposes the tests of the influence of the
expectation reports. The data are described in Section 3. The empirical results of
our tests are reported in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes.
Appendix A describes the specification tests used to arrive at the MA(1) formulation
for the transitory income component, Appendix B summarises the data.
2 The “Canonical Income Model”
It is common to formulate the data generating process (DGP) for the log of income of
person i at time t, yit, as a decomposition into permanent and transitory components.
The permanent component typically takes a Mincerian form, and the law of motion for
its unobservable part is given by a random walk. Unobserved ability or heterogeneity
gives rise to a fixed eﬀect. The specification of the transitory component is given
as an ARMA(p,q) process, but for expositional simplicity we adopt a MA(1) law of
motion. Indeed, standard specification tests, detailed in Appendix A, lead us to adopt
the MA(1) specification for our data. Given the prevalence of this type of income
model in the literature, we refer to it as the “Canonical Model” (CM) of income.1 A
hallmark of this model is the properties that current innovations are “surprises”, and
that past innovations have lasting eﬀects.
To be precise, log income yit is modelled as a linear function of time-varying and
time invariant covariates Zit, and a dynamic error component structure uit:
yit = β0Zit + uit (1)
uit = αi + pit + εit
pit = pit−1 + ηit with ηit ∼ iid
³
0, σ2η
´
εit = νit − δνit−1 with νit ∼ iid
³
0, σ2ν
´
, εi0 ∼ iid
³
0, σ2ε0
´
1Variants of the model are, with reference to U.S. data, estimated in Lillard and Willis (1978),
MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1995), Baker (1997), and Carroll
and Samwick (1997). A recent application to British data is Ramos (2003).
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In this standard specification of the error-component structure αi represents a fixed
eﬀect, pit a permanent income component which follows a random walk with station-
ary innovations, and εit the transitory income component which evolves according to
a MA(1) process.2 σ2ε0 denotes the variance of the initial condition. We assume β 6= 0.
Taking first diﬀerences eliminates the unobservable fixed eﬀect and pit−1, yielding the
CM for income changes
∆yit = β0∆Zit + r1it (2)
r1it = Vit−1 + νit + ηit
where ∆ denotes the first diﬀerence operator, and r1it denotes the first-stage residuals
with Vit−1 = δvit−2 − (1 + δ) vit−1.
The error-component parameters
δ, σ2η, σ
2
ν
are commonly of primary interest since they capture the uncertainty or riskiness of
the income process. We proceed to make this more precise.
2.1 Information Sets and Risk Measurement
Denote the information set of agent i at time t by ΩAit. We assume that the agent
knows all relevant information, ΩAit = Ω
F
it , and that the agent forms full-information
expectations
EFit ≡ E
n
∆yit|ΩFit
o
.
The information set of the econometrician is denoted by ΩEit . We consider a
“best-case” scenario for expositional simplicity by assuming that current and past
observables ∆Zi are contained in this set, but the econometrician cannot observe
past individual innovations vit−τ /∈ ΩEit (which are known to the agent). More gen-
erally, we refer to DGP-relevant variables which are included in the information set
of the agent but are excluded from the information set of the econometrician as ‘pri-
vate information’. Therefore, the econometrician can but form limited-information
expectations
ELit ≡ E
n
∆yit|ΩEit
o
.
Now consider the conditional variance of the income process: The leading example
is the literature on precautionary savings, in which the conditional variance deter-
mines consumption and savings. The agent computes the full information variance
V ar
n
∆yit|ΩFit
o
= σ2η + σ
2
ν.
The only source of randomness stems from the contemporaneous innovations to both
permanent and transitory components of income. The eﬀect of past innovations in
2For expositional simplicity we consider only the case where V ar {νit} is time-invariant. Meghir
and Pistaferri (2003) propose to impose an ARCH specification on the conditional variance.
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transitory income are known to the agent. However, the econometrician will perceive
risk diﬀerently since Vit−1 /∈ ΩEit :
V ar
n
∆yit|ΩEit
o
= 2σ2ν
³
1 + δ + δ2
´
+ σ2η.
He fails to disentangle information known to agent, V ar {Vit}, from his perception of
risk, i.e. the variance of the first stage residuals. The measure of risk thus computed
exceeds the agents’ perception, V ar
n
∆yit|ΩEit
o
≥ V ar
n
∆yit|ΩFit
o
. Since outcomes
other than consumption and savings might be of interest to economists, a separate
literature on the measurement of income risk has recently emerged. Popular cross-
sectional measure of income risk is the coeﬃcient of variation (as in Guiso et al., 2002)
or the variance of the income growth residuals (Burgess et al., 2000 and references
therein), given in CM by V ar {Vit−1 + νit + ηit} = V ar
n
∆yit|ΩEit
o
.
The correct measure of risk as perceived by the agent, V ar
n
∆yit|ΩFit
o
, can be
recovered by the econometrician under the maintained assumptions from realisations
data alone provided he can identify the four parameters δ, σ2η, σ
2
ν , and σ
2
ε0. This can be
achieved by minimising the distance between the empirical and theoretical covariance
matrix of (first-stage) residuals E {r1,itr1,it−s}, as detailed in Appendix A, if he has at
least five waves of panel data. If the information set of the econometrician excludes
an additional set of DGP-relevant mean-zero covariates with cross-sectional variance
σ2X , (such as an indicator for a planned reduction in hours worked) identification
requires one additional wave. With fewer waves, the full information variance is not
identified, and the limited information variance provides only an upper bound. In
this case subjective expectations data may be used to (partially) filter out private
information of agents. Our procedure, explained below, complements the results of
Dominitz (2001), who recovers structural parameters from two waves of panel data by
comparing estimates based on probabilistic expectations data and realisations data.
Such probabilistic expectations data and one-period ahead realisations data make
also possible computing the measure of subjective risk directly as the variance of the
subjective prediction errors. However, such datasets are rather rare and not without
their own interpretative problems.
2.2 Information Sets and Expectation Reports
The agent forms full-information expectations, the econometrician forms limited in-
formation expectations as past innovations are not known to him. However, the agent
makes a categorical report ERit = k based on his expectations, which is recorded in the
survey and thus observable by the econometrician. The categories are ordered {worse
oﬀ, no change, better oﬀ}. The number of categories is K = 3. Any cardenalisation
is arbitrary, and for notational simplicity we set k = 1 to represent the first, k = 2
the second, and k = 3 the third category. The problem of interpreting categorical
expectation data has a long history. We follow Manski (1990) and Das, Dominitz and
van Soest (1999) and assume that
agent i reports category k = ERit ⇐⇒ EFit ∈ Ik
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(labelled the “mean-report assumption” and the leading interpretation), where Ik =
(mk−1,mk]. The interval boundaries are not observable, assumed to be person-
invariant, and the intervals do not overlap. Since the expectation categories are
ordered, it is natural to assume that m0 < m1 < m2 < m3. The authors also discuss
other potential interpretations of categorical expectations data. The next section
briefly considers alternative but naive methods of forming expectations.
Given the assumed DGP, we have
∆yit = EFit + noiseit
= ELit + r1it
with r1it = Vit−1 + noiseit, and noiseit = νit + ηit.
2.3 The Influence of Expectation Reports
Do the expectation reports ERit contain information not contained in the observables
which can be used by the econometrician ? We consider two tests based on the
average residuals conditional on the expectation report E
n
r1it|ERit = k
o
.
The first test is a standard diﬀerence of means test for the diﬀerent categories.
If the expectation report does not contain extra information, then the conditional
residuals should have the same mean. This test does not require a (arbitrary) carde-
nalisation of ERit . A related test consists in regressing the first-stage residuals on the
expectation reports
r1it = γ0 + γERit + r2it. (3)
This approach does require a cardenalisation. It is important to note that the two tests
do not require agents to hold rational expectations (indeed, the literature cited in the
introduction focusses on tests for rational expectations). What we test is whether the
expectation reports contain private information of the agents (which is unavailable to
the econometrician). Rational expectations is one example of expectation formation
in which this should be observed. However, the tests have discriminatory power
against naive expectation formation models. In particular, if the expectation reports
do not contain extra information, then the expected residuals should be the same for
all groups (and equal to zero), and γ = 0. For instance, if the reports were random
then E
n
r1|ERit = k
o
= E
n
V |ERit = k
o
= E {V } = 0. If agents were myopic, then
next period’s forecasted income would be this period’s income, and the expectation
report would be “no change”.
If the tests diagnose private information of agents, regression (3) can be used
to partially correct measures of subjective risk if the error component parameters
cannot be identified from realisation data (i.e. when the panel is not long enough).
This is achieved by filtering out the function ERit of the private information from the
first stage residuals r1, and computing the variance of the second stage residuals (or
filtering out observables ∆Z from the expectation reports and regressing the residuals
from this regression against the first stage residuals).
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2.3.1 Implications for the Coeﬃcient γ
What is the expected sign of the coeﬃcient γ under the maintained assumptions, i.e.
(i) the true DGP is given by CM, which is known to the agents and the econometrician,
(ii) they form rational expectations, and (iii) expectation reports satisfy the mean-
report hypothesis ? We now show that in this case the expected residuals should be
monotonically increasing and γ > 0.
Taking expectations of (3) yields
E
n
r1it|ERit = k
o
= γ0 + γk +E
n
r2it|ERit = k
o
.
But E
n
r1it|ERit = k
o
= E
n
Vit−1 + noiseit|ERit = k
o
= E
n
Vit−1|ERit = k
o
. Moreover,
k = ERit ⇐⇒ EFit ∈ Ik so
E
n
r1it|ERit = k
o
= E {Vit−1|β0∆Zit + Vit−1 ∈ Ik}
= E
n
Vit−1|Vit−1 ∈ eIkio
where eIki = (mk−1 − β0∆Zit,mk − β0∆Zit] which is now person-specific. Assume for
the time being that eIki is person-invariant, i.e. eIki = eIk. Note that E {Vit−1} = 0,
therefore E
n
Vit−1|Vit−1 ∈ eIko 6= 0 unless the conditional expectation is zero on all
three intervals. Since the categories are ordered with m0 < m1 < m2 < m3, and
since E
n
Vit−1|Vit−1 ∈ eIko = R 1 ³v ∈ eIk´ vfv|v∈eIk (v) dv, it follows that for V > 0 we
have E
n
Vit−1|Vit−1 ∈ eIk=3o > 0 and E nVit−1|Vit−1 ∈ eIk=1o < 0. Therefore, we have
a positive correlation cor
³
r1, ERit
´
> 0 which implies a positive regression coeﬃcient
γ > 0. Now consider the case when eIki varies across persons. The above argument
about the positive correlation holds for each agent. Summing positive correlations
across all agents still gives a positive correlation, so again γ > 0.
2.3.2 Inference and Robustness
We briefly raise two issues regarding the implementation of regression (3).
First, inference about γ requires taking into account that an estimable version of
equation (3) includes generated regressors. More precisely, r1it = Vit−1 + noiseit is
unobservable and estimated by the fitted residuals br1 from the first stage regression
(2). In particular r1it = br1it + (r1it − br1it) = γ0 + γERit + r2it, so the estimable version
of equation (3) is br1it = γ0 + γERit + er2it (4)
with er2it = r2it−(r1it − br1it). The mean of the squared second stage residuals estimates
the variance of er2 and not of r2. This requires a correction, and we have used a
bootstrap procedure.
Second, it might be desirable to use an estimation procedure for (3) which is
robust to departures from the null, in particular departure from the mean-report
assumption. It might be conceivable, for instance, that under some alternative ERit
and r2it are correlated via Vit−1. Provided that ERit−2 is suﬃciently correlated with E
R
it
then this could serve as a suitable instrument since Vit−3 is uncorrelated with Vit−1.
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3 The Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the first ten waves of the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), a popular longitudinal dataset built on similar principles as the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the U.S. or the German GSOEP.3 The income
concept is dictated by the survey question about subjective income expectations,
and refers to total (real) household income (and not personal earnings). Our unit of
analysis, however, is the person, since households can form and dissolve over time. We
control for demographic characteristics directly rather than using an equivalisation
procedure. We focus on households whose heads are “prime-aged” (between 25 and 59
years), and thus exclude “young” and “older” households because their life-cycle and
in particular labour markets events can diﬀer fundamentally (the “getting started”
phenomenon, and living in retirement). Appendix B provides summary statistics of
the sample covering demographics, educational attainment, and occupation. Expec-
tation reports and income data are the subject of this section. Note that expectations
are reported at time t while data about actual income changes are obtained from the
t+ 1 wave.
First, we consider the data used to define the expectation reports ERit . The survey
question is: “Looking ahead, how do you think you will be financially a year from
now, will you be: better oﬀ, worse oﬀ than you are now, or about the same?” We have
K = 3 diﬀerent categories, which we have ordered “worse oﬀ”, “about the same”,
“better oﬀ”. The income concept is not defined explicitly.
Next, we consider the income data. The survey does not elicit directly income
levels of respondents. Rather, it contains two diﬀerent sources of information about
income: categorical reports about income changes on the same line as the expectation
reports, and estimates of income generated by the data provider. After describing in
more detail each source, we show that we can use the (log of) generated income as
an instrument for yit. In each wave of the survey respondents are asked to categorise
their perception of actual income changes (“looking back ...”). Again, the income
concept is not explicitly defined, but it is highly likely that the respondent will use
the same metric as in the expectation question. We refer to this data as “categorical
income reports”. The data provider also estimates income.4 It is this variable which
we have used to measure yit, and we refer to it as “actual incomes”. Since the income
concept of the data provider might not correspond to that of the respondent, it is
important to compare the two. In Figure 1 we plot the time series of the mean of the
“actual income” changes for the three categorical income reports. The time-averaged
3The BHPS is a longitudinal panel data set consisting of some 5500 households (approximately
10000 individuals) first interviewed in the autumn of 1991 (wave 1) followed and re-interviewed
every year subsequently. The initial sample represents a response rate of about 69% (proxies in-
cluded) of the eﬀective sample size. Wave-on-wave attrition rates for the subsequent waves are
low. For a detailed discussion of BHPS methodology and representativeness see Taylor (1995), and
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/.
4More precisely, the income measure is the log of the pre-tax post-transfer real household income.
It includes earnings from employment and self-employment, cash social security and social assistance
benefits, and income from savings and investment. See Bardasi, Jenkins and Rigg (1999) for more
detailed information on the BHPS income variable.
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means of actual income change equal -2.3% (perception: “worse oﬀ”), 3.0% (“about
same”), and 6.4% (“better oﬀ”).5 We conclude that the income concept of the data
provider can be used to approximate that of the respondents.
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Figure 1: The mean of “actual income change” by categorical income reports.
Next, we address the quality of the expectations data, by comparing expectation
and income reports, i.e. predictions and realisations. We provide a simple descriptive
examination, which seeks to establish whether the expectations data are potentially
informative, rather than being mere random or myopic reports. First, we compare
the expectation reports ERit to the (next period’s) categorical income reports. The
results are reported in Table 1 . On average, expectations are fulfilled: 44 per cent
of agents expecting to be worse oﬀ report having become worse oﬀ next period, 51
per cent expect and report being the same, and 49 per cent of those expecting to be
better oﬀ report having become better oﬀ. Previous studies partition their sample by
educational attainment (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004, and Hubbard et al.,1995). It
is therefore of interest to distinguish realisations by educational status, in our case in
terms of school-leaving qualifications. Interestingly, the table reveals that the more
highly educated individuals do not hold, on average, more accurate expectations.
This also corresponds to results reported in Dominitz (1998) based on probabilistic
expectations data for the U.S. We therefore do not partition the sample by educational
attainment in the subsequent analysis.
Finally, we relate the expectation reports, via the “categorical income reports”, to
the “actual income changes” measured by ∆yit. The results are reported in Table 2.
Reassuringly the ordering is consistent, as agents expecting to be better oﬀ experience
income growth larger than agents expecting no change, who in turn experience a larger
income growth than agents expecting to be worse oﬀ. For the sake of completeness,
the appendix also contains a descriptive analysis of who holds what expectations
based on ordered logit regressions.
5Other ways of estimating the relationship between perceived and actual income changes provide
very similar results. A random eﬀects regression of actual income change on subjective expectations
and time dummies (to capture macro shocks) provides the following estimates for the means of
actual income change: −1.6% (worse oﬀ), 3% (about same), and 5.2% (better oﬀ).
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expectation reports “categorical income reports”
“worse oﬀ” [%] “about same” [%] “better oﬀ” [%] Total [%]
Entire sample
“worse than now” 44.26 33.99 21.75 100
“about the same” 22.16 50.98 26.86 100
“better than now” 18.03 32.86 49.11 100
University or higher degree
“worse than now” 37.71 33.14 29.14 100
“about the same” 20.49 44.72 34.79 100
“better than now” 16.83 24.32 58.85 100
A Levels or higher vocational degree
“worse than now” 47.52 30.20 22.28 100
“about the same” 23.25 47.32 29.44 100
“better than now” 18.59 31.26 50.15 100
O Levels or less
“worse than now” 43.93 37.96 18.11 100
“about the same” 21.68 55.51 22.81 100
“better than now” 17.96 38.40 43.64 100
Table 1: Subjective expectations and “categorical income reports”. Notes: The cate-
gory ‘O levels or less’ refers to individuals who have left school aged 16 or younger, and
‘A-levels’ to school leavers who have graduated with a university entrance qualifica-
tion (school grade 12). The population shares of the entire sample for the expectation
report categories are 11.8 %, 56.9 %, and 31.3 %.
We proceed to discuss the empirical results based on BHPS data.
4 Empirical Results
The CM has been implemented in the customary way as follows. Observables are
filtered out using OLS. The choice of regressors Zit is conventional and includes all
level covariates listed in column I of Table 8. Detailed results, not reported here for the
sake of brevity, are available from the authors on request. Our set of regressors extends
the usual ones by including covariates which are typically fixed for long periods if not
time invariant, such as occupation. This provides an additional check on the CM,
since the coeﬃcients of these covariates should be zero. As it turns out, this is
typically the case: in particular, the regressors relating to education and occupation
are all insignificant. The estimated β conforms to results in the literature. Filtering
out the observables yields the fitted residuals br1it which are used in the estimation of
the error component structure. The specification tests detailed in the appendix lead
us to adopt the MA(1) specification of the CM given in (1). In the appendix we also
report and briefly discuss the estimates of δ, σ2η, and σ
2
ν, which turn out to be in line
with those reported in the literature.
We turn to the implementation of our tests based on the expectation reports.
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expectation reports “categorical income reports”
“worse oﬀ” “about same” “better oﬀ” Total
“worse than now” -3.0 2.5 7.9 1.3
“about the same” -1.4 2.7 5.3 2.5
“better than now” -3.6 4.1 7.1 4.2
Total -2.3 3.0 6.4 2.9
Table 2: Mean of “actual income changes” (in per cent) by subjective expectations
and “categorical income reports.”
4.1 The Empirical Influence of Expectation Reports
Column II of Table 3 reports the average fitted residuals by expectation group. These
exhibit the positive monotonicity expected under the null hypothesis. The table also
reports the diﬀerence of means tests, testing, for the sake of completeness, all means
together and by pairs. Of course, only K− 1 means need to be tested since the fitted
residuals summed across all agents sum to zero by construction. The diﬀerence of
means tests confirm that the mean residuals diﬀer significantly by expectation group,
and one sided t-tests confirm statistically the monotonicity.
expectation reports mean fitted residuals t-statistic of pairwise diﬀerence of means test
ERit E
nbr1it|ERito “about the same” “better oﬀ”
“worse oﬀ” -.031 -4.565 -5.591
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
“about the same” -.002 -3.843
(p-value) (0.000)
“better oﬀ” .016
Anova F-test 21.03
(p-value) (0.000)
Table 3: Mean of the residuals by expectation groups, and diﬀerence of means tests.
We turn to the estimation of equation (4) and the test of γ. Given the presence
of a generated regressor, we have used a bootstrap procedure with 500 repetitions to
generate standard errors. Table 4 reports point estimates and standard errors. As
expected from the diﬀerence of means tests, the OLS estimates confirm the null hy-
pothesis, exhibiting positive monotonically increasing dummies which are statistically
significant. The F-test suggest explanatory power.
The next column reports the discussed robustness check when ERit is instrumented
with ERit−2.
6 The instruments pass the Sargan test, and the first stage regression
passes the F-test, the estimated γ is insignificant, but the IV regression does not pass
the F-test. Hence this result should not be interpreted as evidence against the null
hypothesis, and is not unexpected given the coarseness of the expectations data.
6Unreported results for extended instrument sets are qualitatively similar and available upon
request.
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expectation reports bγOLS bγIV
“about the same” 0.028 - 0.082
(0.007) (0.049)
“better oﬀ” 0.047 - 0.049
(0.007) (0.044)
constant -0.031 0.063
(0.006) (0.042)
p-value 0.00 0.13
Table 4: Estimation of γ. Notes: SE in parentheses. p-value refers to the F-test.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In the context of income dynamics, we have investigated whether aspects of agents’
superior or ‘private’ information relative to the econometrician’s limited information
are captured in the categorical subjective expectations data elicited annually from
British households. It is natural, for instance, to assume that the econometrician
cannot observe past idiosyncratic shocks to both permanent and transitory compo-
nents of income. Another example is the planned but, in the survey, unrecorded
reduction in the agent’s labour supply. Importantly, our tests do not require agents
to hold rational expectations, but rational expectations is one expectation formation
model in which expectations data should capture relevant private information. We
first find evidence for private information, as the means of the first stage residuals
vary by expectation group and γ diﬀers from zero. At the same time, this evidence
rejects naive methods of forming expectations. Second, the actual monotonicity of
residuals and γ > 0 is consistent with the assumptions maintained in this paper.
If agents have superior information relative to the econometrician, the econo-
metrician’s perception of risk will exceed that of the agent. In particular, we find
V ar
n
∆yit|ΩEit
o
= .12 and, based on the Canonical Model, V ar
n
∆yit|ΩFit
o
= .09,
a diﬀerence of 33 per cent. This has important consequences for the literature on
precautionary savings since here the variance of income changes conditional on the
full information set determines consumption and savings by the agent. Based on
the assumed DGP the correct risk measure can be computed from realisation data
by the econometrician provided the panel is suﬃciently long. If the individual er-
ror component parameters cannot be identified then the bias of the econometrician’s
risk measure can be reduced by filtering out the expectation reports from first stage
residuals, or including the expectation reports as an additional regressor.
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A Error Component Specifications
This appendix briefly details how the MA(1) specification of the CM has been arrived
at, and reports the estimates of the error component parameters.
We started out fitting a low order ARMA specification for the transitory compo-
nent εit. However, the estimates of this specification suﬀered from some common iden-
tification problems.7 Thus, we assumed that εit follows anMA(q) process, with q to be
determined empirically by testing the suitability of the theoretical structure imposed
on the estimated autocovariances E {dr1it dr1it−s}. Specifically, the MA(1) process given
by (1) imposes zero-restrictions on third and higher order covariances. Table 5 reports
the test results8 of zero-restrictions for the null hypothesis that E {r1itr1it−s} = 0 (for
1 ≤ s ≤ 5). Unexplained income growth rates seem to be correlated up to the sec-
ond order: the test statistic does not reject the null of zero autocovariances at third
or higher order (p-value = 0.122), but rejects it at second or higher order (p-value
< 0.001). Therefore we use a MA(1) process to model the transitory component.
Order of covariances
1 2 3 4 5
degrees of freedom 36 28 21 15 10
χ2 401.3 111.0 28.7 9.9 7.2
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.12 0.82 0.71
Table 5: Tests of zero-restrictions for MA(q) order.
Next, we test for the absence of a permanent shock. Following Meghir and Pista-
ferri (2004) we do so by testing whether the variance of the permanent shock E {η2it}
is zero. Given that the transitory component follows aMA(1) process, the covariance
structure of r1it takes, under the null hypothesis of no permanent shock, the form
E {r1itr1it} =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
E {ν2it}+ (1 + δ)2E
n
ν2it−1
o
+ δ2E
n
ν2it−2
o
for s = 0
(1 + δ)E
n
ν2it−1
o
− δ (1 + δ)E
n
ν2it−2
o
for s = 1
δE
n
ν2it−2
o
for s = 2
0 for s > 2.
(5)
Hence
E {r1it (r1it−2 + r1it−1 + r1it + r1it+1 + r1it+2)}
equals zero under the null. Under the alternative hypothesis, however, it equals the
variance of the permanent shock E {η2it}. Since we do not observe the true shocks
7In particular, the estimated variance of the random walk σ2η is negative. Such identification
problems are not unusual in the literature, and have been encountered, inter alia, by Ramos (2003),
Cappellari (2004), Dickens (2000), Baker and Solon (1999) and Baker (1997).
8See e.g. Abowd and Card (1989). The test statistic has the form m0rV
−1
rr mr, where mr is
the subvector comprising the elements of the covariance matrix restricted to zero and Vrr is the
covariance matrix associated to the elements of mr. The test statistic is distributed as a χ2 with
degrees of freedom equal to the dimension of mr.
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σ2η 0.0519
(10.4)
σ2ε0 0.0724
(12.2)
σ2ν 0.0421
(12.3)
δ -0.2645
(-8.7)
SSR 0.0051
χ2 − test 72.2
Table 6: Estimates of the error component structure. Notes: t-ratios in parenthesis.
to income, we use the predicted composite residuals to implement this test, which
is a standard one-sided test. The null hypothesis of no permanent shock is strongly
rejected by the data: The t-statistic is 3.45, which implies a p-value smaller than 0.01.
Table 6 reports the estimates of the error component parameters of the adopted
Canonical Model, and given in (1). We briefly turn to the interpretation of the error
component estimates. The estimates of Table 6 imply that the permanent component
accounts for 43 per cent and the transitory component for 57 per cent of the variance
of the income growth residuals. TheMA(1) process implies that there is no persistent
serial correlation in the (unexplained) income growth rates. The negative estimate of
theMA parameter δ accommodates the (unreported) sharp decline in the covariances
at the first and second orders. Our results for the decomposition into permanent
and transitory components are similar to those obtained in other similar studies, as
are the estimates of the other error component parameters. It is not possible to
compare directly our results with previous studies as these diﬀer in terms of income
concepts, and country focus. This notwithstanding, our parameter estimates are very
plausible when compared to PSID-based studies (see, inter alia, Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004), Baker (1997), Carroll and Samwick (1997), MaCurdy (1982)). The study most
comparable to our set up is Carroll and Samwick (1997) for the U.S. They find a more
unequal relative contribution of the permanent and transitory components to total
income growth variance (33 and 77 per cent, respectively).
B Data Appendix
Table 7 provides summary statistics of the sample. The educational dummies refer
to school-leaving qualifications. The category ‘O levels or less’ refers to individuals
who have left school aged 16 or younger, and ‘A-levels’ to school leavers who have
graduated with a university entrance qualification (school grade 12). The variable
“expectations error” is defined as the deviation between expectations and perceived
income change. Hence, “underpredict a lot” refers to individuals holding “worse
than now” expectations and reporting being “better oﬀ” in the categorical income
change question, whereas “underpredict a little” refers to individuals holding “worse
16
than now” (“about the same”) expectations and reporting being “about the same”
(“better oﬀ”) in the categorical income change question.
Mean SD
Age 40.66 9.20
Sex: Female 0.47 0.50
Education (increasing in levels)
No Qualifications 0.14 0.35
Other Qualifications 0.09 0.28
O levels 0.21 0.41
A levels 0.12 0.32
Other Higher Qualifications 0.29 0.46
Health limits work: Yes 0.07 0.26
Marital Status: Married 0.80 0.40
Children
1 child 0.18 0.39
More than 1 child 0.26 0.44
Decreased number of children 0.04 0.21
Increased number of children 0.03 0.18
Job Status
Self-employed 0.12 0.33
Became self-employed 0.02 0.13
Became employee 0.02 0.12
Full-time or Part-time
Part-time 0.19 0.39
Became Part-time 0.03 0.17
Became Full-Time 0.03 0.18
Contract
Non-standard 0.05 0.22
Became non-standard 0.02 0.15
Became Permanent 0.03 0.17
Region
North 0.58 0.49
Does change region 0.02 0.12
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Mean SD
Stan.Occupation Class.
Professional 0.12 0.33
Associate profess. technical 0.12 0.33
Clerical 0.17 0.38
Craft related 0.12 0.33
Protective services 0.09 0.29
Sales 0.06 0.23
Plant machine operatives 0.09 0.28
Other 0.06 0.24
Got a “worse” occupation 0.10 0.30
Got a “better” occupation 0.11 0.32
Time Dummies
Wave 2 0.12 0.33
Wave 3 0.11 0.31
Wave 4 0.11 0.31
Wave 5 0.11 0.31
Wave 6 0.11 0.31
Wave 7 0.11 0.32
Wave 8 0.11 0.31
Wave 9 0.11 0.31
Log (income level) 9.75 0.50
∆ in incomet−1,t
“worse oﬀ” 0.23 0.42
“better oﬀ” 0.33 0.47
Expectations Errort−1,t
“underpredict a lot” 0.02 0.14
“underpredict a little” 0.18 0.39
“overpredict a little” 0.23 0.42
“overpredict a lot” 0.06 0.23
Table 7: Summary statistics for the pooled sample. N=24,531
For the sake of completeness, Table 8 describes who holds what expectations. Re-
ported are the estimates of ordered logits of the three expectations categories. The
baseline specification, labelled I, includes a set of standard covariates measuring demo-
graphics and labour market characteristics (including dummies for: self-employment,
part and full time worker, whether the job is permanent or temporary (“contract”),
and the standard occupational classification). We have included occupational sta-
tus as indicators of the potential complexity of the income generating process, and
these turn out to be significant. Many level variables, in particular income levels
and time-invariant covariates such as education, are not significant, whereas many
“event” variables, referring to events between t− 1 and t, are significant.
We also report an augmented specification, labelled II, which adds to I indicators
for the perceived income change, and the past expectations error. The significance
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of all these variables suggests a dynamic structure of how expectations are formed.
Perceived income changes in the past twelve months seem to have an impact on
expectation formation. People who suﬀered a subjective income fall (gain) are more
(less) pessimistic about their future income than people who have experienced no
income change. This phenomenon has also been observed for the Netherlands (Das
and van Soest, 1999).
Individuals do not seem to revise their expectations in the light of past prediction
errors. Individuals who underestimated their incomes in the past are more pessimistic,
and people who overestimated them are more optimistic than those who saw their
expectations fulfilled; i.e. the predictions of the under-predictors do not, on average,
improve. Moreover, people who “underpredicted a lot” are more pessimistic than
those who “underpredicted a little”, while individuals who “overpredicted a lot” are
less pessimistic than those who “overpredicted a little”.
I II
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Age -0.087 0.000 -0.055 0.000
Age squared 0.001 0.014 0.0004 0.049
Sex: Female -0.201 0.000 -0.170 0.000
Education included not significant included not significant
Health limits work: Yes -0.145 0.025 -0.119 0.036
Marital Status: Married 0.035 0.495 -0.014 0.744
Children: 1 child -0.123 0.012 -0.068 0.106
more than 1 child 0.020 0.703 0.043 0.306
decreased 0.023 0.725 0.065 0.331
increased 0.004 0.958 0.387 0.000
Job Status: self-empl. 0.326 0.000 0.236 0.000
Became self-employed 0.215 0.057 0.261 0.025
Became employee 0.378 0.001 0.273 0.024
Full-time or PT: Part-time 0.025 0.650 0.049 0.275
Became Part-time 0.062 0.449 0.117 0.175
Became Full-Time 0.116 0.120 0.002 0.984
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I II
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Contracts: Non-standard 0.176 0.055 0.137 0.095
Became non-standard -0.109 0.366 -0.088 0.482
Became Permanent 0.241 0.001 0.129 0.105
Occupation Class.
Professional -0.147 0.044 -0.114 0.055
Associate profess. technical -0.112 0.110 -0.077 0.185
Clerical -0.117 0.081 -0.066 0.233
Craft related -0.289 0.000 -0.189 0.001
Protective services -0.168 0.027 -0.099 0.109
Sales -0.041 0.605 -0.026 0.701
Plant machine operatives -0.328 0.000 -0.239 0.000
Other -0.320 0.000 -0.227 0.002
Got a “worse” occupation 0.210 0.000 0.157 0.001
Got a “better” occupation 0.149 0.001 0.103 0.023
Region: North -0.045 0.249 -0.018 0.552
Changes region 0.497 0.000 0.530 0.000
Time Dummies included significant included significant
Log (income level) included not significant included not significant
∆ in incomet−1,t: “worse oﬀ” -0.966 0.000
“better oﬀ” 1.547 0.000
Expectations Errort−1,t
∗
“underpredict a lot” -1.505 0.000
“underpredict a little” -0.912 0.000
“overpredict a little” 1.002 0.000
“overpredict a lot” 2.198 0.000
Number of obs 25277 24531
P-value of χ2 0 0
Log likelihood -22705.2 -20687.3
Table 8: Ordered logits: Who holds what expectations ?
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